Hanke warns China’s rare-earth grip blocks tariffs before Xi visit
Steve Hanke argues that China's near-monopoly on rare-earth refining gives it leverage over U.S. tariff policy before Xi Jinping's September visit. With China controlling 91% of refined production, the IEA warns of $6.5 trillion in exposed manufacturing value. U.S. domestic supply covers only a fraction of the 48,000 metric ton annual demand, complicating diversification efforts.

*this image is generated using AI for illustrative purposes only.
Economist Steve Hanke warns that China’s dominance in rare-earth processing and permanent magnet production will prevent President Donald Trump from imposing higher tariffs on China before President Xi Jinping’s scheduled visit to the United States in September. Hanke, a professor of applied economics at Johns Hopkins University, stated on X that "China knows its chokehold... will prevent Trump from imposing higher tariffs," adding that "CHINA = HOLDS ALL THE CARDS." This geopolitical stance follows a May summit in Beijing where Washington reported that China agreed to address U.S. concerns regarding shortages of critical minerals such as neodymium and yttrium.
Supply Chain Concentration
The leverage cited by Hanke stems from a highly concentrated global supply chain. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), China accounted for 60% of mined magnet rare earths, 91% of refined production, and 94% of sintered permanent magnets in 2024. These materials are essential components for electric vehicles, electronics, and advanced weapons systems. The IEA recently warned that disruptions to Chinese exports could expose $6.5 trillion in annual manufacturing outside China to supply shocks, noting that small volumes of specialized materials can threaten entire automotive, energy, and defense production lines.
| Metric | China's Share (2024) |
|---|---|
| Mined magnet rare earths | 60% |
| Refined production | 91% |
| Sintered permanent magnets | 94% |
Export Controls and Domestic Gaps
Beijing imposed licensing requirements on several rare earths and magnets following Trump’s tariff increases in 2025. Although the White House described the May talks as progress, Reuters reported that China did not agree to dismantle its export-control system and continued restricting shipments of dysprosium and terbium. This restriction highlights the gap in U.S. domestic capacity; U.S. demand for the most common rare-earth magnet reached roughly 48,000 metric tons in 2025, while domestic sources supplied only about 300 tons.
Strategic Diversification Efforts
Analyst Chris Berry stated that eliminating Chinese supply by the Pentagon’s 2027 deadline is not feasible without significantly more processing capacity. Defense suppliers have pressed for additional time, while the Trump administration has supported domestic miners, magnet plants, and a $12 billion strategic stockpile. Washington has also proposed a critical-minerals trade bloc with allies to mitigate these dependencies. Despite these efforts, the immediate reliance on Chinese processing capabilities remains a central factor in trade negotiations ahead of the September meeting.
How might the proposed $12 billion strategic stockpile impact rare-earth market prices and investment incentives for domestic miners in the short term?
What specific regulatory or financial mechanisms could accelerate the construction of non-Chinese processing facilities to meet the Pentagon's 2027 deadline?
Could the formation of a critical-minerals trade bloc with allies effectively bypass China's export controls, or will it face similar geopolitical pushback?

























