Goldman Sachs private credit fund sees redemptions fall to 2% in Q3
- GS Credit fund redemptions fell to 2% in Q3 from 3.2% in Q2
- Fund attracted $400 million in gross subscriptions during the quarter
- Apollo, Blackstone, and Morgan Stanley capped redemptions at 5% amid higher demand
- Class I shares returned approximately 9.4% since inception through August 2026

*this image is generated using AI for illustrative purposes only.
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (NYSE: GS) reported that redemption requests for its $18.2 billion GS Credit fund fell to 2% of shares in the third-quarter tender offer, down from 3.2% in the prior quarter. This decline suggests easing outflow pressure for the vehicle, which has maintained repurchase requests below the typical 5% cap since its launch.
The fund attracted approximately $400 million in gross subscriptions during the period. Goldman noted that a significant portion of the investor base originates from its private wealth business, where clients typically possess longer investment horizons and accept lower liquidity compared to institutional allocators. The firm did not provide additional detail on what drove the third-quarter inflows or the decline in redemption requests.
Peers face elevated withdrawal demands
While Goldman saw moderation, other major non-traded private credit funds continued to manage significant redemption pressure by enforcing caps.
| Fund | Asset Size | Redemption Request | Cap Applied | Prior Period Request |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| GS Credit (Goldman Sachs) | $18.2 billion | 2% | None disclosed | 3.2% |
| Apollo Debt Solutions BDC | $26 billion | 14.7% | 5% | 16.8% |
| Cliffwater LLC Flagship | Not specified | ~16% | 5% | Not specified |
| North Haven Private Income (Morgan Stanley) | Not specified | 11.4% | 5% | Not specified |
| Blackstone Private Credit Fund (BCRED) | $77.2 billion | ~10% | 5% | Not specified |
Apollo Global Management (NYSE: APO) capped redemptions at 5% after investors sought to redeem 14.7% of shares in the Apollo Debt Solutions BDC, a decrease from the 16.8% requested in the prior period. This marks the third consecutive quarter of elevated redemptions for the fund. Morgan Stanley (NYSE: MS) faced similar constraints at its North Haven Private Income Fund, where investors attempted to withdraw 11.4% of shares, more than double the 5% buyback limit.
Blackstone (NYSE: BX) also capped withdrawals at 5% for its $77.2 billion Blackstone Private Credit Fund (BCRED) after investors tendered roughly 10% of shares. Jon Gray, President and COO of Blackstone, stated earlier this month that investor confidence in private credit would recover despite broader concerns about valuations and underwriting. "Over time, investor confidence will be rebuilt, and the inflows will return," Gray said. "There's a lot of noise, a lot of critics; the town criers are proclaiming a global crisis - and then nothing happens."
Market sentiment shifts on software credit
Competing funds have experienced heavier redemption activity through 2026 as investors assessed underwriting discipline and the outlook for software borrowers amid AI-related shifts. However, GS Credit indicated a change in tone regarding this sector.
"The concerns around software-related credit quality that dominated headlines earlier in 2026 have begun to moderate," the fund stated. "While Q1's 'SaaSpocalypse' narrative and Q2's enterprise software spend uncertainty drove aggressive spread widening, the Q3 landscape has shifted meaningfully."
What the numbers show
A divergence exists between Goldman’s organic liquidity management and its peers' forced caps. While Apollo, Cliffwater, Morgan Stanley, and Blackstone all hit the 5% redemption ceiling—indicating unmet demand exceeding 9% to 11% of assets—Goldman’s GS Credit fund absorbed requests at just 2% without needing to cap withdrawals. This suggests that Goldman’s specific investor mix, heavily weighted toward long-horizon private wealth clients, provided structural stability absent in funds with broader retail or institutional bases. Additionally, the fund reported an approximate 9.4% total return for Class I shares since inception through August 31, 2026.
Will the divergence in redemption rates between Goldman Sachs and its peers prompt other asset managers to restructure their investor bases toward private wealth clients to enhance liquidity stability?
How might the moderation of the 'SaaSpocalypse' narrative in Q3 influence future underwriting standards and spread pricing for software-focused credit deals in 2027?
Given that peers like Apollo and Blackstone continue to hit redemption caps, what regulatory or structural changes might emerge to address the liquidity mismatch in non-traded private credit funds?

































