Saudi oil output slumps to lowest since 1990 as OPEC+ rises
- Saudi Arabia reports crude output at lowest level since 1990
- OPEC+ average output rose to 38.05 million BPD in August 2026
- Group output increased by about 300,000 BPD from July levels
- Global oil demand growth forecast cut to 380,000 BPD from 580,000 BPD

*this image is generated using AI for illustrative purposes only.
Saudi Arabia informed the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) that its crude oil production has fallen to its lowest point since 1990. This disclosure highlights a severe contraction in output from the kingdom, which serves as the cartel's de facto leader.
The reported slump indicates a substantial drawdown in Saudi supply relative to historical benchmarks. By citing the 1990 low, the data underscores the magnitude of the current production cut compared to nearly three decades of prior activity.
OPEC+ Output and Demand
While Saudi output contracted, broader cartel activity showed movement. OPEC+ crude output, including former member UAE, averaged 38.05 million BPD in August 2026. This represents an increase of about 300,000 BPD from July cuts in 2026.
Global oil demand growth forecasts have also been revised. The forecast is now set at 380,000 barrels per day, down from the previous forecast of 580,000 BPD.
| Metric | Value | Change / Context |
|---|---|---|
| OPEC+ Avg Output (Aug 2026) | 38.05 million BPD | Up ~300,000 BPD from July |
| Global Demand Growth Forecast | 380,000 BPD | Down from 580,000 BPD |
Market Implications
Such a significant reduction in output from a major global supplier typically exerts upward pressure on crude prices, assuming demand remains stable. The move aligns with broader efforts to manage supply levels within the OPEC framework.
What the Numbers Show
The divergence between Saudi Arabia’s historic production lows and the slight increase in overall OPEC+ output suggests other members may be offsetting Riyadh’s cuts. Additionally, the sharp downward revision in global demand growth forecasts—from 580,000 BPD to 380,000 BPD—provides context for why supply management remains critical despite the aggregate output rise.
How will the 200,000 BPD gap in global demand growth forecasts impact OPEC+'s decision to maintain or deepen voluntary production cuts beyond 2026?
Which specific non-Saudi OPEC+ members are likely to increase output to offset Riyadh's historic lows, and what are the geopolitical risks of shifting this burden?
Could Saudi Arabia's production dropping to 1990 levels signal a long-term structural shift in its energy strategy rather than a temporary market adjustment?

































