Krypton Industries Limited Announces Postal Ballot Results with All Special Resolutions Approved
Krypton Industries Limited announced the successful completion of its postal ballot process on March 26, 2026, with all three special resolutions receiving overwhelming shareholder approval through remote e-voting. The resolutions included regularization of two independent directors and approval for executive remuneration exceeding statutory limits.

*this image is generated using AI for illustrative purposes only.
Krypton Industries Limited has successfully concluded its postal ballot process, with shareholders approving all three special resolutions through remote e-voting. The company announced the results on March 26, 2026, following the completion of the voting period that ran from February 24 to March 25, 2026.
Postal Ballot Overview
The postal ballot process was conducted exclusively through remote e-voting, with the company appointing Mr. Altab Kazi Uddin as the scrutinizer to ensure fair and transparent proceedings. The voting commenced at 09:00 am IST on Tuesday, February 24, 2026, and concluded at 05:00 pm IST on Wednesday, March 25, 2026.
| Parameter: | Details |
|---|---|
| Total Shareholders on Record Date: | 12600 |
| E-Voting Start Date: | February 24, 2026, Tuesday at 09:00 a.m. |
| E-Voting End Date: | March 25, 2026, Wednesday at 05:00 p.m. |
| Postal Ballot Notice Date: | February 23, 2026 |
Special Resolutions Approved
Shareholders voted on three special business items, all of which received overwhelming approval:
Resolution 1: Regularization of Mr. Mukul Banerjee as an Independent Director (Non-Executive Independent Director)
Resolution 2: Regularization of Mrs. Vaishnavi Gupta as an Independent Director (Non-Executive Independent Director)
Resolution 3: Approval for Payment of Remuneration to Mr. Digvijay Singh Bardia exceeding the limits prescribed under Section 196, 197 and other applicable provisions of the Companies Act 2013
Voting Results Summary
The e-voting participation showed strong support across all resolutions, with 60 shareholders casting votes totaling 3017169 shares, representing 20.53% of the company's outstanding shares of 14697130.
| Resolution: | Votes in Favour | Votes Against | Approval Rate (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resolution 1 (Mukul Banerjee): | 3017117 | 52 | 99.9983 |
| Resolution 2 (Vaishnavi Gupta): | 3016117 | 1052 | 99.9651 |
| Resolution 3 (Remuneration Approval): | 3017127 | 42 | 99.9986 |
Shareholder Category Participation
The voting pattern showed significant participation from the promoter and promoter group, who held 3863497 shares and voted 3012595 shares, representing a 77.98% participation rate from this category. Public non-institutional shareholders, holding 10830733 shares, had minimal participation with only 4574 votes cast, representing 0.04% participation. Public institutional shareholders, holding 2900 shares, did not participate in the voting process.
Regulatory Compliance
The postal ballot process was conducted in accordance with Regulation 44(3) read with Regulation 30 and Schedule III of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015. The company has filed the voting results along with the scrutinizer's report with the Bombay Stock Exchange Limited and The Calcutta Stock Exchange Limited. The detailed voting results and scrutinizer's report are also available on the company's website at www.kryptongroup.com for shareholders' reference.
Historical Stock Returns for Krypton Industries
| 1 Day | 5 Days | 1 Month | 6 Months | 1 Year | 5 Years |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| +5.56% | +1.47% | -19.48% | -43.70% | -34.89% | +221.72% |
What strategic initiatives will the newly regularized independent directors bring to Krypton Industries' board governance?
How will the approved remuneration package for Mr. Digvijay Singh Bardia impact the company's operational expenses and future executive compensation policies?
What factors contributed to the extremely low 0.04% participation rate among public non-institutional shareholders, and how might this affect future corporate governance decisions?


































